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INTRODUCTION
Congress' enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996' ('96
Act) was the culmination of twenty-five years of debate over the regulation
of communications common carriers and the replacement of much of that
regulation with competition. The replacement of regulation with competition
actually began in 1968 with the Federal Communications Commission's
decision in the Carterfone case.2 Prior to Carterfone, regulated monopoly
was the umbrella under which telephone common carriers operated.
* The author practices communications law in Washington, D.C.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13 F.C.C.
2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 597 [hereinafter CarterfoneDecision], aff'd and clarifedby
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.2d 571, 14 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 185 (1968).
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I. THE HISTORY OF COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 marks a return to the type of
competition that prevailed among telephone companies in the early part of
the twentieth century. Local exchange telephone companies competed
vigorously, with numerous companies offering service in a single city
without regulation of interconnection. In fact, there was little interconnec-
tion? Telephony came to be viewed as an essential service so that by 1913,
states began to regulate the telephone common carriers through the public
utility commissions.4 The state commissions were given authority to grant
monopoly status to telephone common carriers and eliminate competition.
They also had the power to order the telephone carriers to interconnect and
to regulate their prices. Competition in telephony disappeared while state
commissions controlled entry.
In 1934, Congress adopted the Communications Act ('34 Act)5 which
created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) and
commenced regulation of interstate telecommunications activities and
companies. The '34 Act gave the FCC power to control entry, regulate
prices, and take whatever action was in the public interest including
approving mergers and acquisitions. The FCC cooperated with the state
commissions in following a jurisdictional separations policy between
intrastate and interstate service and interconnection. A part of this policy
was designed to keep local rates low by assigning greater expenses to
interstate service.' The result was interstate subsidization of local exchange.
The FCC began to alter its monopoly policy in 1968 with its
Carterfone decision.' That decision invalidated tariff provisions, which
prohibited attachment of customers and provided equipment to the telephone
company's network. The following year, the FCC granted MCI authority to
construct a microwave system competing with the Bell System between
Chicago and St. Louis.8 It expanded the MCI decision to permit entry of
3. JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE 109 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Shively-Spencer Act of 1913, IND.CoDE § 8-1-2-88. (1995).
5. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6. In re AT&T and the Assoc. Bell System Cos. for Interstate and Foreign Comm.
Serv., Interim Decision and Order, 9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967).
7. Carterfone Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 597.
8. In Re Applications of Microwave Comm., Inc. For Construction Permits to Establish
New Facil. in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. at Chicago, Ill.,
St. Louis, Mo., and Intermediate Points, Decision, 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969); aff'd and
clarifiedby Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 190, 18 Rad.Reg. 226 (P & F)
(1970).
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specialized common carriers in 1971. While competition was being
permitted in intercity service and terminal equipment, there was no
competition permitted by the states in local exchange service. That
noncompetition in local exchange continued until the enactment of the '96
Act.
The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, chaired by
Senator Philip Hart, held a series of hearings in 1973 and 1974 on the
question of competition in telecommunications."° The hearings, while
directed at AT&T, reflected on the entire telecommunications industry.
Subsequent to those hearings, the Department of Justice filed an antitrust
suit, against AT&T and the Bell System companies that resulted in the
breakup of the Bell System." MCI had earlier filed an antitrust suit
against AT&T and the Bell System. 2 While the Senate hearings did not
result in legislation, they did spur the introduction of further competition.
Thereafter, AT&T and the telephone industry launched a lobbying effort to
get Congress to adopt legislation that would preserve the telephone
companies' monopolies. However, it proved unsuccessful.
Further, in 1981 the FCC moved to increase competition in telecom-
munications when it adopted the structure and procedure for cellular mobile
radio service (CMRS). 3 This cellular order provided for the licensing of
two carriers in each market. It also prohibited limitations on resale and
required that service to resellers be on a non-discriminatory basis. Thus, the
order not only opened competition with a duopoly of licensees in each local
market, it also spawned many other competitors as resellers.
Congress has placed its imprimatur on this move to competition with
the '96 Act. The enactment of the '96 Act will change significantly the
9. In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures For Consideration of App'n to
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Serv. in the DomesticPublic Point-to-Point Microwave
Radio Serv. and Proposed Amend. to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Comm'n Rules, First
Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870,22 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1501, [hereinafter Specialized
Common Carrier Services Order], reconsideration denied in Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106, 23 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1501 (1971), affirmed sub nomn.
Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. Competitionin Telecommunications, 1973-74: Hearingson S. 1167 Beforethe Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. (1974).
11. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
12. MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891.
Competition also received a boost when MCI obtained approval of switched services. MCI
v. AT&T, 496 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1974).
13. In re Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-970 MHz for Cellular Comm.
Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 49 Rad. Reg 2d (P & F) 809 (1981)
(proceeding terminated). See also In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, SecondReport and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 835 (1994).
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application of the antitrust laws to communications activities. The FCC
stated that in enacting the '96 Act, "Congress sought to establish 'a
procompetitive, de-regulatory national policy framework' for the United
States telecommunications industry."4 Prior to the enactment of the '96
Act, telecommunications companies were somewhat immunized from full
application of the antitrust laws, regarding mergers and acquisitions,
because of regulation by the FCC and the state public utility commissions.
Section 601(b)"5 of the '96 act provides:
(b) ANTITRUST LAWS.
(1) SAVINGS CLAUSE. - Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3), nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of
the antitrust laws.
(2) REPEAL. - Subsection (a) of section 221 (47 U.S.C. 221(a))
is repealed.
(3) CLAYTON ACT. - Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
18) is amended in the last paragraph by striking "Federal Communi-
cations Commission,".
This language may have a significant effect on future mergers and
acquisitions of telecommunications companies as well as their activities. No
longer will FCC approval of merger or acquisition insulate the carrier from
action under the Clayton Act.
II. THE CLAYTON ACT EXEMPTION AND REPEAL OF
SECTION 221(A)
Under the old section 221(a) of the '34 Act,'6 the FCC was vested
with authority to review and approve or disapprove mergers and acquisi-
tions of telephone companies. It is only in more recent years that the FCC
considered the issue of antitrust implications of a merger or an acquisi-
tion. 7 Earlier, the Commission simply viewed the issue in light of the
14. In re NYNEX Long Distance Co. App'n for Authority Pursuant to Section 214 of
the Comm. Act of 1934, as amended, to provide Int'l Serv. from Certain Parts of the U.S.
to Int'l Points through Resale of Int'l Switched Serv., Order, Authorizationand Certificate,
11 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 6, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1295 (1996) (D.A. Acting Chief, Int'l
Bureau) (quoting S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996)) [hereinafter NYNEX Order].
15. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, see. 601(b), 110 Stat. 56,
143.
16. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §221(a)) (1994).
17. See In re S. Cent. Bell Phone Co. and S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 7136 (1991); In re The Mountain States Tel and Tel. Co.,
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Pacific NorthwestBell Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 1982 (1990).
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overall public interest standard.'" Section 7 of the Clayton Act 9
exempted similar transactions of the FCC. Exemptions in each act are now
repealed. The result is that such transactions are now subject to the full
scope of the Clayton Act, as well as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.20 The
FCC, however, retains its jurisdiction over the issuance and transfer of
licenses and, the public interest standard gives it wide latitude in consider-
ing licensing. The repeal of section 221(a) does not affect other provisions
in the '34 Act. However, with the language in section 601(b)(1) of the '96
Act, dual enforcement of the antitrust laws will exist with both the
Department of Justice and the FCC. The result is greater avenues for the
Department of Justice and private parties to challenge mergers and
acquisitions.
Parties, seeking to merge or acquire a telecommunications company,
dould find themselves in three separate venues with three separate standards.
Under section 7 of the Clayton Act,2' either a private party or the
Department of Justice could go into court, to seek an injunction preventing
the transaction, on the grounds that it substantially lessens competition.
Likewise, under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the parties may be required to
file for approval, with the Department of Justice, because of the size of the
transaction.22 If the transaction involves the transfer of licenses by the
FCC, the public interest standard must be met.' Private parties could
challenge at the FCC with petitions to deny. The House Senate Conference
Report for the 1996 Act states:
In addition, if immunity were conferred under section 221 (a), it would
allow mergers between telecommunications giants to go forward
without any antitrust or securities review. In the old world, the statute
was usually used to confer immunity on mergers between non-
competing Bell operating subsidiaries or mergers between Bells and
small independents within their territories. Neither of these situations
involved competitive considerations.
However in the future, the conferees anticipate that cable
companies will be providing local telephone service and the BOCs will
be providing cable service. Mergers between these kinds of companies
18. In re App'n. of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. For A Certificate Under Section 221(a)
of the Comm. Act of 1934, as Amended, to Acquire the Tel. Plant and Properties of the
DeSoto Mut. Tel. Co., Located in and Around the Community of DeSoto, Kansas, Initial
Decision of Hearing Examiner David I Kraushaar, 1 F.C.C.2d 1420 (1965), aff'd in
Decision, I F.C.C.2d 1411.
19. Clayton Act §7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
20. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. §18(a).
21. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
22. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. §1(a).
23. 47 U.S.C. §309. See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 313, 314 (none of these sections were
changed by the '96 Act).
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should not be allowed to go through without a thorough antitrust
review under the normal Hart-Scott-Rodino process. The new language
contains a conforming change to clarify that these mergers will now be
subject to Hart-Scott-Rodino review. By returning review of mergers
in a competitive industry to the DOJ, this repeal would be consistent
with one of the underlying themes of the bill-to get both agencies
back to their proper roles and to end government by consent decree.
The Commission should be carrying out the policies of the Communi-
cations Act, and the DOJ should be carrying out the policies of the
antitrust laws. The repeal would not affect the Commission's ability to
conduct any review of a merger for Communications Act purposes, e.g.
transfer of licenses. Rathe; it would simply end the Commission's
ability to confer antitrust immunity.
Clearly, Congress intended future review of mergers and acquisition
to be subject to all three acts. This will impose a greater burden on the
parties seeking to merge or engage in sizable acquisitions. What is not
addressed is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. If a party files in the
courts to prevent a merger/acquisition under the Clayton Act, does the
federal court defer to the FCC for initial determination and is that FCC
determination binding on the Court?24 If a party files a petition to deny
transfer of the license, and in the courts, the FCC may defer consideration
of anticompetitive effects until the appropriate federal court has rendered a
judgment on such issues.' The argument that, because of pervasive
regulation by the FCC, telecommunications carriers are immune from the
antitrust law has met with little success. The courts have generally denied
immunity from the antitrust laws.26
III. FCC APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS
Although the '34 Act does not explicitly require the FCC to adjudicate
allegations of anticompetitive behavior of communications licensees,
pursuant to its mandate, the FCC does consider anticompetitive behavior to
reach decisions which are consistent with the public interest. Section 314
of the '34 Act states that no person, engaged in the transmission of radio
communications, may act in a way which substantially lessens competition
or restrains commerce.27 In addition, pursuant to section 309 of the '34
24. Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1073 (1984).
25. Mobilfone of Northeastern Pa., Inc. v. FCC, 682 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
26. See Phonetele v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1145
(1983); Southern Pacific v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1005 (1985); Mid-Texas v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372, cert. denied,499 U.S. 412 (1980); Otter
Tail Power v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 314.
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Act, the Commission's authority to grant applications is conditioned upon
a finding that "the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
by the granting of such application." '2 The '34 Act also prohibits price
discrimination.29 This is similar to a prohibition in the Robinson-Patman
Act ° Lastly, the Commission is mandated by statute to make available an
efficient communications service at a reasonable cost, consistent with the
public interest, convenience, and necessity."
In AT&T (Designation Order), the Commission found that its public
interest determination should include consideration of the effects of
proposed actions on competition.32 Harkening back to the fundamental
principle established in its Specialized Common Carrier Services Order,33
the Commission expressed what remains the guiding principle in its public
interest determination: the "promo[tion] and mainten[ance] [of] an
environment within which existing and any new carriers shall have an
opportunity to compete fairly and fully"34 Specifically, the FCC would not
provide "any 'protective umbrella' for new entrants or any artificial
bolstering of operations that cannot succeed on their own merits."' The
FCC's policy envisioned and encouraged an environment comprised of
entities thriving on competition and providing high quality service to
customers at reasonable prices.
Under the framework of the FCC's "full and fair competition"
standard,3" antitrust concerns, such as an applicant's market power and the
28. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 202.
30. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13(a).
31. 47 U.S.C. §205.
32. In re the App'n of AT&T For Auth. Under Section 214(a) of the Comm. Act of
1934, asAmended, To SupplementExistingFacilitiesBetween Boston, Mass.,Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 501, par. 25 (1974).
33. SpecializedCommon CarrierServices Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 22 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1501, recon, deniedin Memorandum Opinion and Order, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106,23 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1501 (1971), affirmedsub nom Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v.
FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975).
34. In re App'n of AT&T For Auth. Under Section 214(a) of the Comm. Act of 1934,
as Amended, To Supplement Existing Facilities Between Boston, Mass., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 501, pare. 17 (citing SpecializedCommon CarrierServices
Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, pare. 90, 22 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1501) (emphasis added).
35. Id. (citing SpecializedCommon CarrierServices Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, pare. 90,
22 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1501) (emphasis added).
36. Although the Commission has interpreted and applied the antitrust laws in a fashion
uniquely tailored to the communications industry, the FCC may look to well-established
principles of antitrust law, where they are relevant, for guidance. See In re AT&T
Investigation into the lawfulness of Tariff FCC No. 267, offering a Dataphone Digital Serv.
Between Five Cities, Final Decision and Order, 62 F.C.C.2d 774 (1977).
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proposal's effect on competition, constitute only one component37 of the
public interest determination undertaken; this evidence is then weighed
against other evidence38 to determine whether the benefits resulting from
the proposal outweigh the costs of diminished competition. In addition to
the more rapid introduction of advanced technology, other public interest
benefits which the FCC will weigh include reductions in barriers to new
customers and the resulting spread of fixed costs over a larger population
of users, economies of scale, efficient use of the spectrum, and the
improvement in service resulting from the carrier's own choice, as to the
most efficient distribution system. 9 The FCC's cost-benefit analysis
reflects consideration of the "special considerations that have influenced
Congress to make specific provision for the particular industry."4
In the McCaw/AT&T case the FCC approved the merger, finding that
it would have procompetitive effects. The FCC noted that the merger would
"lead to a broadened range of consumer choices, more price competition,
an increased responsiveness to consumer needs and desires on the part of
competing carriers and potential entrants, as well as incentives for continued
technical and service innovations in the cellular service business.' 14 The
FCC went on to hold that likely procompetitive results outweighed any
potential anticompetitive effects.42 The weighing of benefits and harms
under the public interest standard gives the FCC far more leeway than the
courts have under the Clayton Act standard of "lessening competition."
The FCC has consistently held that its public interest standard and the
antitrust laws exist to protect the pubfic interests, not the economic
interests of competitors.43 The FCC is mandated by statute to review the
actions of common carriers to prevent discrimination against subscribers."
That Congress intended for the FCC's focus to be on customers and not on
37. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 82, 85 (1980).
38. Id. at 82.
39. In re Bundling ofCellular CustomerPremises Equip. and Cellular Serv., Reportand
Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 4028, paras. 19-21, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1288 (1992).
40. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 86 (citing FCC v. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S.
86, 98 (1953)) (citations omitted); See generally NYNEX Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 8685, 3
Comm. Reg. 1295 (P & F) (1996).
41. In re Craig 0. McCaw and AT&T For Consent to the Transfer of Control ofMcCaw
Cellular Comm., Inc. and its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
5836, para. 57,75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1345 (1994) [hereinafter McCaw/AT&T."The pro-
competitive effects of a merger can be as important to our competitive analysis as the
anticompetitive effects." Id
42. Id. para. 61.
43. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 102 (citing Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1961)).
44. See MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd
in part, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
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competitors45 is evident from the '34 Act which includes remedies only for
injured customers, not competitors. 46 Nonetheless, the FCC analysis is
similar to the Supreme Court's in Brown Shoe47, which stated that market
share and concentration are critical in a Clayton Act analysis.
The concentration argument, however, was not accepted by the Court
in Cincinnati Bell,48 where the Court remanded the FCC rulemaking
regarding how cross-ownership affects eligibility for PCS auctions. The
Court rejected the FCC argument that a minority interest in a PCS license
by a cellular licensee in the same market was predictive of an incentive not
to compete. The Court, however, did not address the questions of potential
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act49 (price fixing) and section 8
of the Clayton Act.5"
In its reconsideration order and in responding to the courts, the FCC
adopted traditional antitrust standards regarding minority ownership in
competing companies.5 ' By adopting the new rules on attribution, the
Commission rejected a "control-based" attribution test. The Commission
stated:
We reject a control-based attribution test because significant, but non-
controlling, investments have sufficient potential to affect the level of
competition in the CMRS market. The CMRS spectrum cap ownership
attribution rule, just as all other ownership attribution rules and similar
statutory provisions, must take such interests into account. Economic
theory predicts that where a CMRS licensee owns a substantial portion
of one of its competitors, neither company has as strong an incentive
to compete vigorously against its partner as it does with respect to an
unrelated competitor That is the case for several reasons. A company
that is entitled to a substantial percentage of the profit generated by its
competitor will be reluctant to undercut the competitor's price - doing
so would amount to taking money out of its own pocket. Rather than
45. See, e.g., id.; In Re Channel 41, Inc. (WUHQ-TV), Battle Creek, Mich. For
Modification of Constr. Permit, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 595, para.
5, 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 73, recon. denied in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 30
F.C.C.2d 6, 22 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 147 (1971).
46. MCI v. AT&T, 462 F.Supp. 1072, 1088 (N.D. I1. 1978).
47. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
48. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit
decision may be an anomaly and of doubtful precedential value. It seems to hold opposite
Congress' specific language in 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (1994).
49. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; see also United States v. United States Gypsum, 438
U.S. 422 (1978); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
50. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1994));
see also Square D Company v. Schneider S.A., 760 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
51. In re Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Comm'ns. Rules-Broadband PCS
Competitive Bidding and the Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Spectrum Cap, Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 7824, para. 121 (1996).
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compete on price, both companies have an incentive to maintain a high
price level by coordinated interaction. In any event, the minority
shareholder would have an incentive to stifle vigorous price competi-
tion. It would also have the capability of doing so because a minority
owner may exert influence over the company by challenging various
business decisions, by conducting (or even just threatening) litigation,
by refusing to provide additional capital, by insisting upon business
audits, or by using other mechanisms by which minority owners protect
their investments in closely held firms.
Under 47 C.F.R. § 20.6(e)(4)(i), a party holding a controlling interest in
both a cellular licensee and a PCS licensee in the same market, must divest
one of the two within 90 days. 2 These factors, however, may not receive
the same weight from the FCC. The public interest standard gives the FCC
wide latitude, but it may need to make specific economic findings in light
of the Cincinnati Bell case.
IV. SEPARATE SUBSIDIARIES
In section 272 of the '96 Act, Congress has adopted separate
subsidiary requirements, for the former Bell operating companies, that are
intended to impose a wall between local exchange and manufacturing or
interlata service. This adopts a structure initially adopted by the FCC in the
GTE/Telenet case.53 The FCC, in that case, expressed concern over
possible cross-subsidization of competitive services with monopoly services.
This cross-subsidization concern has been of paramount importance to
regulators, as competition increased.
In the McCaw/AT&T case, the FCC took a contrary approach and
declined to require structural separation. The Commission held that other
requirements, imposed on the merger, cured concerns over possible cross-
subsidization or misallocation of costs between regulated and unregulated
business.54 This case marks a significant departure from the antitrust
theory that anticompetitive conduct necessarily flows from structure. The
McCaw case stands for the antitrust theory that structure, plus conduct, is
necessary for structural separation. Structure, without the conduct, is benign.
It is a long held economic misconception that, by breaking-up or preventing
vertically or horizontally integrated structures, anticompetitive conduct is
prevented. Such a view may prevent business from taking advantage of
52. 47 C.F.R. § 20.6(e)(4)(i) (1995).
53. In reApp'n of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation to Acquire Control of
Telenet Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 91, 107, n.34, 45 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1189, 1201, n.34 (1979) [hereinafter GTE/Telenet].See also California v.
FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. McCaw/AT&T, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1345 (1994).
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economies of scale and cost efficiency that provide a lower cost product for
the consumer."5 It is noteworthy that the court in Cincinnati Bell,56 in its
remand, cast doubts on the structural separation imposed on BOC's,
between their cellular and wireline companies, 7 which was effectively
repealed by section 601(d) of the '96 Act.
Even though section 272 of the '96 Act imposes the separate
subsidiary requirement only on former Bell System companies, other non-
Bell local exchange carriers must, however, proceed with caution in acting
as a unitary enterprise. Cross-subsidization of competitive services, by
monopoly services, also runs afoul of the Clayton Act. Leveraging
monopoly power in one market, to gain an advantage in another market,
would violate the Clayton Act and be construed as anticompetitive by the
FCC.58
In the NYNFX Oider, regarding out-of-region BOC interstate
interexchange services, the FCC held that such services must be offered
through a separate subsidiary. That separate subsidiary must maintain
separate books. It is not permitted to jointly own transmission or switching
equipment with the LEC nor to take tariffed services from the LEC's
general tariff.59
In approving a merger or acquisition, the FCC has wide discretion in
imposing conditions, affecting structure and operation, that may not be
imposed by the courts or the Department of Justice.
V COMPETTION IN LOCAL EXCHANGE
Among the significant changes, brought about by the '96 Act, is the
introduction of competition into local exchange service. Section 251
imposes interconnection duties on local exchange carriers to provide
connection to competing carriers. Likewise, section 253 of the '96 Act
55. Id at 5905 n.284, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1374, n.284.
56. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F. 3d 752, 768 (6th Cir. 1995).
57. See also In re An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890
MHz for Cellular Comm. Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, paras. 48-52, 49
Rad.Reg. 2d (P & F) 809 (1981) (proceeding terminated), as modified in Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,89 F.C.C.2d 58 (1982) (proceeding terminated): In
re Policy and Rules Concerning the Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced
Services and Cellular Comm. Serv. by the Bell Operating Cos., Report and Order, 95
F.C.C.2d 1117, paras. 48-52 (1983) (as codified 47 C.F.R. § 22.903 (1994)). Section 601(d)
of the '96 Act permits wireline carriers to jointly market cellular and other local exchange
services.
58. United Statesv. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 603
F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979).
59. NYNEX Order, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 8685, para. 7, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1295 (1996)
(D.A. Acting Chief, International Bureau).
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precludes a state commission from denying a competing local exchange
carrier the right to enter the market. In addition, section 251 provides for
entry by resellers of local exchange service. In many ways, the clock has
been turned back 100 years. What is different is the regulatory compulsion
of interconnection.
The '96 Act does not mention section 152(b) of the '34 Act which
reserved to the states, jurisdiction over intrastate carriers.6" Section 152(b)
bumps up against section 253(a) of the '96 Act that limits the state PUC
action if it restricts entry. When Congress adopted the 1993 amendments
regarding CMRS, it specifically excluded application of section 152(b).61
The '96 Act makes no such exclusion. The result is an inconsistency within
section 253 of the '96 Act. Subsection (a) restricts the states, subsections
(b) and (c) recognize a form of state jurisdiction, and subsection (d) gives
the FCC the power to preempt the states. If that is confusing, throw in
section 152(b) and it looks chaotic. The FCC adopted regulations for the
implementation of the '96 Act's requirements of competition in local
exchange on August 8, 1996 in its Second Report and Order.62 The
Commission stated "potential competitors in the local and long distance
markets face numerous operational barriers to entry not withstanding their
legal right to enter such markets. The dialing parity, nondiscriminatory
access, and network disclosure requirements should remove those barriers
to entry." 3 This Second Report and Order places the FCC in the role of
directly regulating local exchange service. Whether that is beyond the power
of Congress and the FCC is a question of profound importance. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stayed the implementation of
the regulations pending review.64
In its First Report and Order on Local Exchange, the Commission
concluded that the dual regulation by the federal and state agencies was
significantly altered by the '96 Act. 5 The Commission went on to
60. 47 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1994).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3). Under the '96 Act CMRS is excluded from access charge
requirements under section705, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, see.
705, § 332(c)(8), 110 Stat. 56, 152, andjoint marketing restrictions, id. sec. 601(d), 110 Stat.
at 144.
62. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, SecondReport and Orderand Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Dkt.
No. 96-98, FCC 96-333, para. 2 (Aug. 8, 1996).
63. Id. para. 3.
64. Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, Nos. 96-3321, 96-3406,96-3436, 96-3414, 96-3416, 96-
3410,96-3430, 96-3418,96-3424, 1996 WL 589204 (8th Cir. 1996). A motion to vacate the
stay was denied on Nov. 12, 1996, 117 S.Ct. 419.
65. In re Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and
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conclude that section 251 of the '96 Act is binding on the states, "even with
respect to intrastate issues." There are dramatic changes that limit the
regulatory role of the state commissions, over telecommunications, except
to promote competition as defined by the FCC.
VI. CONGRESS'S POWER To REGULATE LOCAL EXCHANGE
It is likely that Congress, acting under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, has power to regulate telecommunications that are connected
to the switched nationwide network.66 But it must make findings to
support such a legislative concept. The Conference Report makes little
mention of the language, except to say that state laws to protect the "captive
utility ratepayer from the potential harms caused by such activities are not
preempted." Congress does not clarify what that means.
The Commerce Clause expressly gives Congress power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."'67
"Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent
legislation arising from the projeletion of one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another State."' In short, the clause was intended to
create a common market with uniform regulations governing national
concerns.
69
Congress's grant of authority is practically limitless, reaching well
beyond commerce to include most economic relationships." Indeed, the
Commerce Clause limits state power even where Congress has not acted.71
This self-executing aspect of the provision is known as the "dormant" or
"negative" Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause "by its own force
created an area of trade free from interference by the States."'73 The
significance of this judicial construction of the provision's scope is this: a
state law can be challenged if it impermissibly burdens interstate commerce,
even where Congress has chosen not to exercise the full scope of its
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, FirstReport and Order, CC Dkt. No. 96-96,
FCC 96-325 (Aug. 8, 1996).
66. North Carolina Utilities Comm. v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
67. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).
69. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 317 (1851).
70. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 839 (1937); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
71. See Barclays BankPLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S.Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994);
Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., 908 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. Barclays, 114 S.Ct. at 2276 n.9.
73. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987).
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authority in preempting a particular field of activity.
In telecommunications, Congress surprisingly avoided giving the FCC
power to regulate the intrastate aspect. Until adoption of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBR) in 1994, and section 332 of the '34
Act 74 Congress's adoption of section 151 stood as a bulwark against FCC
intervention into the intrastate realm of local exchange. Section 253 of the
'96 Act changes that. Congress has made an enormous leap, with section
253, to give the FCC the power to invalidate what may be intrastate
activity. The principal issue, however, is whether there were sufficient
findings to support this quantum leap by Congress. In the OBR, Congress
preempted state regulation of CMRS rates and entry by CMRS carriers. The
Second Circuit has upheld that preemption.' The authority of the
Commerce Clause, however, must be viewed against the restrictions in the
Tenth Amendment.
Tenth Amendment76 issues would normally be trumped by Commerce
Clause findings, but the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez77 gives states' rights new meaning. The Tenth Amendment is not
mentioned in Lopez. The case instead turns on limitations of the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, however, cannot be viewed in a vacuum.
Even though ignored, the Tenth Amendment hovers over the decision.
The Constitutional source of the states' "historic police powers" is the
Tenth Amendment.7 The courts "use the Tenth Amendment to encompass
any implied constitutional limitation on Congress's authority to regulate
state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself, or in
principles of federalism, derived generally from the Constitution."'79 The
nature and extent of this limitation on federal power was rejected in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.8° As the Court later explained in
South Carolina v Baker:
The Tenth Amendment limits on Congress's authority to regulate state
activities are set out in Garcia [ ]. Garcia holds that the limits are
structural, not substantive-i.e., that states must find their protection
from congressional regulation through the national political process, not
through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity"
74. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1994, 47 U.S.C. § 332 (1994).
75. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842 (2nd Cir. 1996).
76. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
77. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
78. U.S. CONST. amend, X.
79. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 (1988).
80. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
81. Baker, 485 U.S. at 512 (citations omitted).
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Thus, it is the legislative process which protects the fundamental
interests of the states, and not the courts. 2 If Congress has the power to
act, then a state's local interests cannot limit that power.83 Moreover, no
"residuum of power" resides in the states to make laws that limit federal
power.8
4
More practically, National League of Cities had attempted to create a
framework for identifying "traditional governmental functions," which the
Court said were immune from federal regulation under the Tenth Amend-
ment. In doing so, the Court provided an elaborate explanation of protected
and unprotected state functions."5 These functions generally consisted of
health and safety measures undertaken by local governments. 6
Garcia, nevertheless, undermined the legitimacy of any attempt to
identify "traditional governmental functions," calling the National League
of Cities Court's methodologies "unworkable," "arbitrary," "unmanageable,"
and ultimately unconstitutional. Accordingly, "historic police powers"
should be narrowly construed. Garcia, however, must be contrasted with
Lopez. In Lopez, the Court pointed out that the legislative history contained
no express findings, regarding the effect on interstate commerce. Prior
legislation by Congress reflects a recognition of the intrastate nature of local
exchange service. Lopez brings into question the constitutional validity of
section 253 of the '96 Act and the FCC's implementing regulations. While
it would appear that all of telecommunications, even at the local exchange
level, affects interstate commerce it must be viewed against thirty-six years
of legislative precedent calling part of it intrastate. This long hands-off
attitude of Congress must be used to argue a Congressional recognition of
its being solely within the states ambit.
82. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 452 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting state's argument
that Tenth Amendment "carves out a sphere of state influence upon which even the
Commerce power may not intrude").
83. See Columbia River Gorge United v. Yeutter, 960 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1944); see also, Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315, 316 (1920) (stating "the purpose of Congress to
subject such companies to a uniform national rule [left] no room thereafter for the exercise
by the several states of power to regulate.").
85. See Nat'lLeague of Cities,426 U.S. at 851, 854 n.18; see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at
538-39.
86. See Ridings v. Lane County, 862 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1988) (construing Nat 7League
of Cities) (operation of a police force is a traditional governmental function); see also
Bonnette v. Cal. Hqalth and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) ("declaring the
chore worker" program not a traditional government function because federal government
established and funded program); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 452 (control of roads and highways
not subject to plenary state control); Air Transport Ass'n v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 833 F.2d
200 (9th Cir. 1987) (statingthe antidiscriminationprovision ofCommunications Act didnot
preempt state law which protected privacy interests).
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CONCLUSION
The '96 Act injects competition into telecommunications with a burst.
But with competition also comes the antitrust law to provide the rules of
conduct. The antitrust focus will now achieve a new status for telecommuni-
cations.
Likewise, the '96 Act intrudes into areas long thought to be intrastate,
and the sole province of state regulatory commissions. Congress has
dramatically changed the rules. The question is whether, in changing those
rules so as to federalize all aspects of telecommunications, it has violated
the Constitution.
